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Case No. 20090421-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Robert L. Baugh, III,
Petitioner/ Appellant,
vs.

State of Utah,
Respondent/ Appellee.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Robert Baugh appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post conviction
relief. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(f) (West
2009 Supp.).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Should Baugh's claims be disregarded because they are inadequately

briefed?
Standard of Review. "Briefs that do not comply with rule 24 'may be
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court/ Utah R. App. P.
240)." State v. Gambiin, 2000 UT 44, f 8,1 P.3d 1108.
2.

Did the district court properly deny and dismiss the petition for post-

conviction relief?

Standard ofReview. "Our standard of review for an appeal from a dismissal of
a petition for post-conviction relief depends on the issue appealed. Though we
review the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, we will disturb findings of
fact only if they are clearly erroneous. Further, "'we survey the record in the light
most favorable to the findings and judgment; and we will not reverse if there is a
reasonable basis therein to support the trial court's refusal to be convinced that the
writ should be granted/" Mattlwws v. Galetka, 958 P.2d 949, 950 (Utah App. 1998)
(citations omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. Const. Amend. VI.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-9-101 through 110
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Baugh was originally charged by Information with one count of Rape, a
first degree felony, and one count of Forcible Sodomy, a first degree felony (R12627). Following a preliminary hearing Baugh was bound over for trial (R130-197).
An Amended Information charged Baugh with one count of Unlawful Sexual
Conduct with a 16 or 17 year old, a third degree felony, and one count of Forcible
Sexual Abuse, a second degree felony (Rl99-200). On December 8,2006, Baugh pled
guilty to the amended charges (R202-209). In addition to the reduced charges, as

2

part of the plea agreement, the State also agreed to dismiss case no. 061904255, in
which Baugh had been charged with two third degree felonies of issuing a bad
check and theft by deception (R206 & 424, Evid. Hrg. Trans, p. 126).
Baugh was sentenced to zero to 5 years for the crime of unlawful sexual
conduct with a 16 or 17 year old. He was sentenced to 1 to 15 years for the crime of
forcible sexual abuse (R211-212).
Baugh did not file any motion to withdraw his plea and did not file any direct
appeal (R424).
Baugh timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief (Rl-17). In response,
the State filed a motion to dismiss (R99-256). Following oral argument the district
court granted the State's motion to dismiss as to all issues except the claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel (addendum A, R331-334). On appeal, Baugh has
not challenged that decision. The district court ordered that an evidentiary hearing
be held solely on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel (R334). Therefore, the
only issue on appeal is dismissal of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court's Findings and
Conclusions and Order of Dismissal was filed on July 21,2009 (addendum B, R421442).

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS1
The victim, NJ, met petitioner Baugh in 2005 when she asked her friend
Cassy2 if she could give her a ride somewhere (R138,145). Cassy said her boyfriend
could give her a ride. Cassy's boyfriend was petitioner Baugh. Id. At the time,
Cassy was 16 years old. The victim, NJ, was only 15 years old (R146, R137).
Petitioner Baugh was 36 years old (R146).
Baugh owned a concert company named Pit Bull Concerts or Pit Bull
Entertainment (R139). Baugh hired high school teenagers for what was called a
"street team." (R139-140). The street team would pass out flyers and do things to
help promote the concert company. Id. NJ was hired for one of Baugh's street
teams. She was not paid in money, but was told that she would receive a cell phone
and could go to concerts for free (R140). NJ never actually received a cell phone
(R141).
When Baugh wanted them to pass out flyers, he would call the teenagers on
the street team and ask them to come over to his house (R142). NJ was a street team
captain and there were about ten teenagers on her team. Id. Most of them were 16
or 17 years old (R143).
1

Because Baugh pled guilty, there is no trial transcript. Therefore, the facts
have been taken from the transcript of the preliminary hearing (R133-197).
2

At various places in the record her name is spelled as "Cassy" or "Cassie."
Both versions refer to Ms. Hughes.
4

NJ testified that she would hang out at Baugh's house. She testified that her
relationship with Baugh was not just business, but that they were friends too (R143).
NJ described Baugh's house as a place to hang out and be able to relax and not have
the watchful eyes of her parents around. Id. The teenagers would hang out at
Baugh's house and he would buy them cigarettes and alcohol (R143-144).
In August of 2005, NJ had gone over to Baugh's house and did not want to go
home. She wanted to stay there and drink alcohol (R145). She told her mom that
she was sleeping over at Cassy's house, but actually she stayed at Baugh's house.
Id.
NJ and Baugh started playing a drinking game and NJ was getting intoxicated
(R146). Baugh asked if she would mind if he put on a pornographic movie. Id. NJ
told him no, she didn't mind, because she was trying to "be cool and not a stupid,
little girl." Id. Baugh then asked if he could kiss her. Id. He said, "You have to let
me kiss your luscious lips." (R146). NJ felt a little uncomfortable, but she let him
kiss her. Id. But she wouldn't let him kiss her again because he had a girlfriend and
it "kind of grossed [her] out." Id.
Baugh then started telling NJ that his family was in the mafia and his
Godfather was the head of the mafia (R147). He also told her that he could make
her rich and that she could get $8,000 a week and have prostitutes on State Street.
Id. NJ testified that she "kind of was, like, wow, you know, power and money and
5

stuff/7 Id. They had a long conversation in which Baugh told her that he could
make her a powerful leader of four girls, but she had to complete three tests to
prove her loyalty. Id. The three tests Baugh told NJ she had to do to prove her
loyalty were to sleep with him three times (R147-148). NJ had sex with Baugh that
night (R148).
Baugh told NJ that she couldn't tell anybody or else she "would have real bad
consequences/' like her family would be punished or she would be beaten basically that the mafia would be after her if she told anybody (R148).
NJ told her friend Marinda, her friend Breann, and her ex-boyfriend that she
was raped, but she wouldn't tell them anything else (R148). Sometime in late
October or early November, NJ told Cassy about the mafia (R148-149). About two
days later, NJ told Baugh that she had told Cassy because she did not want Cassy
telling him first (R149-150).
When NJ told Baugh that she had told Cassy about being in the mafia, Baugh
was really angry, and told NJ that she had to suffer a consequence (R150-151).
Baugh took NJ to a hotel where the Godfather was supposed to be staying (R150).
NJ thought the hotel was the Comfort Inn but could not recognize an address
(R151). She thought it was downtown, but she was not exactly sure. She testified
that it wasn't 'Tike in the middle I don't think. It was more like on the outskirts."
(R151).
6

Baugh told NJ that she had three choices for her consequence - she could have
her boyfriend killed, she could be beaten and put in the hospital for six months, or
she could have sex with him one more time (R150,152). NJ chose the consequence
of sleeping with Baugh (R152-153). Baugh then had oral and vaginal sex with NJ
(R154-155).
Afterwards, NJ went into the bathroom to clean herself up and get dressed,
and then she cried (R155). Baugh then drove her home. On the way, they talked
about the Godfather, and how NJ should not tell anybody ever again (R155). NJ
was "terrified of what would happen if I didn't do what he asked me/' (R180).
In February of 2006, NJ was in treatment at a drug and behavioural
rehabilitation center and she told her counsellor about the sexual abuse (R156,161).
The counsellor reported the incident and NJ spoke to the police (R155,165).
FACTS FROM THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING
At the evidentiary hearing in the post-conviction case, Baugh's trial counsel
testified that she had received and reviewed a packet of discovery from the
prosecutor, and she continued to receive supplemental discovery (Evid. Hrg. Trans,
p. 13-14, 26).
She was counsel for Baugh at the preliminary hearing. Id. at 127. Following
the victim's testimony at the preliminary hearing, she was concerned that the jury
might perceive the victim more favourably than she had hoped. Id. at 127.
7

Prior to entry of the guilty plea, trial counsel talked to some of the potential
witnesses Baugh wanted her to talk to. Id. at 45,51, 68-69, 76, 77. She also had an
investigator talk to some of the witnesses. Id. 45,67,71. In addition, she was aware
that the police had talked to some of the potential witnesses, and she had
information from police about their interviews. Id. at 120-121. In fact, at the
preliminary hearing, she asked Detective Powell about his interviews with Jessica
Kershaw and Cassie Hughes. Id. at 120-121. Counsel testified that she believed
either she or her investigator or the police had spoken to all of the potential
witnesses whose names Baugh had given to her. Id. at 130-131.
Counsel testified that she was concerned about calling Cassie to testify at trial
because of her age and her relationship with Baugh. Id. at 81,124. In fact, she was
worried about him being charged with another crime because of his relationship
with Cassie. Id. at 82-83. Counsel was also concerned about calling Jessica Kattera
[Kaddourah] to testify at trial because of her age when she had Mr. Baugh's
daughter. 3 Id. at 123-124,140-141. She was concerned that their relationship would
have been an illegal act at the time. Id. at 124.

3

In his brief, Baugh states that Jessica Kaddourah was twenty-one years old
when she and Baugh met. However, Baugh presents no record cite or authority to
support his statement, and there is no evidence establishing Ms. Kaddourah's actual
age anywhere in the record.
8

Counsel was also aware that Baugh had prior convictions, including a
conviction for a sexual offense against a minor. Id. at 93-94, 124-126. She was
concerned about the possibility of that prior conviction being admitted at trial. Id. at
88,124-126. If the case had gone to trial, she would have filed a motion to suppress
the prior conviction. Id. at 89,92. However, she was worried that it still might have
been admitted. Id. She told Baugh that it would be detrimental if it did come in,
and if they went to trial, it was a gamble they would have to take. Id. at 90-91.
Counsel testified that the victim's testimony at the preliminary hearing
indicated to her that the crime occurred between when Baugh went to Court and
Thanksgiving. Id. p. 42. She followed up on information provided by Baugh and
found out that he was in court on November 15th. Id. at 44,117. Counsel testified
that Baugh did not have an alibi because he could not account for all of the time
between the day he went to court and Thanksgiving. Id. at 44, 51. She talked to
Baugh about this, and he attempted to account for that time period, but he could
not. Id. at 44-45, 54-56, 60.
Trial counsel also testified that she subpoenaed records from the Comfort Inn,
and had a telephone conversation with the manager. Id. at 61-62. If they had gone
to trial, she would have attempted to admit information that the Comfort Inn did
not have any record of Mr. Baugh registering there. Id. at 66, 78,116. She did not
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believe that information was enough to establish Baugh's innocence, but it would
have been helpful information at trial. Id. at 65,116.
Trial counsel testified that she analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of the
State's case before giving Baugh her opinion about whether or not to accept the plea
offer. Id. at 123. When she conveyed the plea offer, she gave Baugh the chance to
ask questions about it. Id. at 130. She also told him that "if he wanted to go to trial I
would do everything I could for him at trial/' Id. She then gave him her
professional opinion that he should accept the plea offer, and she told him why that
was her opinion. Id. at 87,130. It was Mr. Baugh's decision to accept the plea offer.
M a t 130.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Baugh7s claims should be dismissed because they are inadequately briefed.
Baugh does not appropriately challenge the decision of the district court, but merely
asserts the same arguments he raised in his petition for post-conviction relief.
Rather than provide meaningful legal analysis, Baugh merely states facts that he
believes support his claims and concludes that he is entitled to relief. This does not
conform to the requirements of the briefing rule.
Even if Baugh's brief is not dismissed for inadequacy, the decision of the
district court should be affirmed because the petition for post-conviction relief was
properly denied and dismissed. The district court acted appropriately when it
10

dismissed some of the claims prior to the evidentiary hearing, and Baugh has not
challenged that decision. The district court also ruled correctly when it held that
Baugh had not established any ineffectiveness of counsel.
ARGUMENT
I.
BAUGH'S CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THEY
ARE INADEQUATELY BRIEFED.
Baugh appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.
However, in his appellate brief, Baugh merely repeats the same arguments raised in
his post-conviction petition. Although Baugh states that the district court erred in
dismissing his petition, he provides no argument, case law, or legal analysis to
establish that any of the court's findings were clearly erroneous, or that its
conclusions of law were incorrect. Rather than provide meaningful legal analysis,
Baugh merely repeats the arguments raised below4 and concludes that he is entitled
to relief. This does not conform to the requirements of the briefing rule.
A, Baugh failed to properly brief his issues.
Rule 24 (a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires an appellant to
include his "contentions and reasons . . . with respect to the issues presented/'
4

Although not entirely clear, it appears that Baugh attempts to raise some
new issues, which were never raised in his petition. If a claim was not raised in the
petition, and was therefore not addressed by the district court, it will not be
addressed for the first time on appeal. See Pascual v. Carver, 876 P.2d 364,366 (Utah
1994).
11

including "citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on/ 7
This Court does not address issues inadequately briefed under this rule. 5 See State v.
Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, 1 6, 1 P.3d 1108 (refusing to consider argument which is
inadequately briefed); MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 947-48 (Utah 1998).
Utah courts have consistently held that issues not properly briefed should not
be addressed on appeal. See State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). "'A
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent
authority cited/" State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120,130 (Utah App. 1997) (citing State v.
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988)).
Baugh has not properly briefed the issues. His brief does not identify any
specific error by the district court.

It does not cite to the record nor does it cite

applicable authority. It also does not provide any meaningful legal analysis. See
State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247 (Utah App. 1992); Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108 (Utah
App. 1995). Baugh nowhere provides an analytical basis for his claim that denial of
his petition for post-conviction relief should be overturned on appeal. See Utah R.

5

The State acknowledges that pro se briefs must be construed liberally. See
Moll v. Carter, 179 F.R.D. 609,610 (1998); Whitney v. State ofN.M., 113 F.3d 1170,1173
(10th Cir. 1997). However, pro se litigants must still comply with minimal standards.
Id. In addition, as addressed below, none of Baugh's claims are meritorious. If
errors alleged in the pro se brief, even if properly presented, would not amount to
reversible error, they do not require full analysis. See State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50,
55 (Utah 1993).
12

App. P. 24(a)(9) (providing that argument section of appellant's brief must "contain
the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented...
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on"); see also
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (holding that "rule 24(a)(9) requires
not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned
analysis based on that authority"); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989)
(holding that brief "must contain some support for each contention"). Baugh
merely repeats the legal arguments that the post-conviction court rejected without
analyzing why the post-conviction court erred.
This Court is not "'a depository in which the appealing party may dump the
burden of argument and research/" State v. Jaeger, 973 P.2d 404, 410 (Utah 1999)
(quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988)), and see Thomas, 961 P.2d at
305. Accordingly, Baugh's claims should be rejected. See Jaeger, 973 P.2d at 410
(refusing to consider appellant's claim due to the lack of meaningful analysis of
cited authority); Warelwm, 772 P.2d at 966 (refusing to address claim on appeal
where petitioner's brief "wholly [lacked] legal analysis and authority to support his
argument"); State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 548-49 (Utah App. 1998) (same); State v.
Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992) (same).
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B. Baugh failed to marshal all of the evidence in support of the
district court's findings
Baugh's claims also fail because his grounds for relief ignore the district
court's findings and conclusions in support of its rulings. The law is well-settled
that although the Court of Appeals will "review the trial court's conclusions of law
for correctness, [it] will disturb findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous.
Further, '"we survey the record in the light most favorable to the findings and
judgment; and we will not reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to support
the trial court's refusal to be convinced that the writ should be granted.'"" Matthews
v. Galetka, 958 P.2d 949, 950 (Utah App. 1998) (citations omitted).
A court's findings are "clearly erroneous only if they 'are against the clear
weight of the evidence'" or if the reviewing court "'reaches a definite and firm
conviction'" that they are mistaken. State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293,295 (Utah 1992)
(quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1987)). The burden is on Baugh to
marshal all of the evidence in support of the district court's findings and then to
demonstrate that the evidence does not support the findings. State v. Alvarez, 872
P.2d 450,460-61 (Utah 1994).
Baugh makes no attempt to marshal the evidence supporting the court's
ruling and to demonstrate its insufficiency. Therefore, this Court may "accept the
trial court's findings as stated in its ruling." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558
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(Utah 1999). When an appellant fails "to properly marshal the evidence in support
of the trial court's findings of fact, we do not consider those findings properly
challenged and, therefore, assume the evidence supports them/' Chen v. Stewart,
2004 UT 82, f 3,100 P.3d 1177.
Baugh fails to carry his burden. Instead, he refers to facts or events that he
believes are favorable to his position and then broadly asserts that contrary to the
district court's ruling, the record supports his claims.6 "'What appellants cannot do
is merely re-argue the factual case they presented in the trial court/" State v. Clark,
2005 UT 75, If 18.124 P.3d 235, quoting Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82 at 177. Because
Baugh has failed to marshal the supporting evidence and demonstrate its
insufficiency, this Court should accept the district court's findings as stated in its
ruling. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d at 558.
In sum, Baugh's claims are inadequately briefed and neither marshal the
evidence supporting the district court's findings, nor demonstrate that its ruling is
erroneous. Therefore, this Court should decline to consider Baugh's challenge to the
district court's ruling denying his petition for post-conviction relief. See Crookston v.

6

Baugh did not provide a transcript of the post-conviction evidentiary
hearing. Although he requested the transcript, he apparently never made
arrangements to pay for the transcription. Therefore, the State requested the
transcript and it is now available on appeal.
15

Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789,800 (Utah 1991) (failure to marshal evidence); Jaeger, 973
P.2d at 410 (failure to meaningfully analyze claims).
II.
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED AND DISMISSED
THE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF.
A. Baugh has failed to establish that the district court erred in
finding that trial counsel provided effective assistance.
Even if Baugh's brief is not dismissed for inadequacy, the decision of the
district court should be affirmed because the petition for post-conviction relief was
properly denied and dismissed.
In the post-conviction case below, the State's motion to dismiss was granted
as to all issues except Baugh's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection
with his guilty plea (addendum A, R 331-334, 422). The district court found that
"[t]he gravamen of petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is that he
would not have entered a guilty plea if he had been confident that his lawyer would
both investigate and assert his claimed innocence, which claim relied on an alleged
alibi defense and assertions of inconsistencies in the evidence/' (addendum B,
R425).
In his brief, Baugh alleges that the district court erred in dismissing his
petition (Appellant's Brief at 3). He argues that his trial counsel was ineffective
because she 1) never sought to establish or develop a working relationship with him

16

and failed to investigate crimes charged in a capital case, 2) did not investigate the
prosecutor's case against him, 3) did not investigate his alibi, 4) did not investigate
the underlying facts or interview prospective witnesses, 5) had a conflict of interest
because she believed he was guilty, and 6) denied him his right to due process. Id.
at 3-4.
In its ruling, the district court concluded that Baugh had not met his burden
to establish ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland standard (R431).
The court found that trial counsel "performed her duties in a competent and
effective manner" and her performance was "well within the expected standard of
performance of an experienced criminal defense lawyer, and even had she engaged
in all of the activities that petitioner now proposes, there is no reasonable likelihood
that the outcome would have been any different." (R431).
Baugh has failed to establish that the district court's decision was incorrect.
The underlying facts and the evidence presented at the post-conviction evidentiary
hearing clearly support the district court's ruling (Evid. Hrg. Trans, pp. 8-219).
1. Issues not raised below cannot be addressed for the first time
on appeal.
In his brief, Baugh asserts that his counsel never sought to establish or
develop a working relationship with him, and failed to investigate crimes charged
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in a capital case.7 Baugh also asserts that his counsel did not investigate the
prosecution's case against him and that she denied him his right to due process.
However, these issues were never raised in his post-conviction petition below (R517 and 274-283).
If a claim was not raised in the petition, and was therefore not addressed by
the district court, it will not be addressed for the first time on appeal. See Pascual v.
Carver, 876 P.2d 364,366 (Utah 1994), CfLafferty v. State, 2007 UT 73, | 23,175 P.3d
530.
2. The district court correctly ruled that trial counsel followed a
reasonable and diligent procedure in investigating witnesses
and evidence.
Baugh alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective because she did not
investigate his alibi, and did not investigate the underlying facts or interview
prospective witnesses (Appellant's Brief at 3-4).
Interviewing witnesses, Baugh alleges that his counsel did not interview
prospective defense witnesses (Appellant's Brief at 4). He asserts that "there are
witnesses to confirm both the petitioner's and the alleged victims whereabouts for
the time in question. Making it impossible for the petitioner to commit these
crimes." Id.

7

Of course, this is not a capital case.
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Failure to adequately investigate the underlying facts of a case cannot fall
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and cannot be
considered a tactical decision. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990).
However, simply alleging that counsel failed to adequately investigate is not
sufficient to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Baugh needed to
show that his counsel failed to do a constitutionally sufficient investigation and had
to also detail what any further investigation would have revealed. See State v. Strain,
885 P.2d 810, 818 (Utah App. 1994). Baugh failed to meet that burden.
The district court reviewed all of the evidence and the applicable law, and
heard testimony from trial counsel, petitioner Baugh, and several other witnesses
(R422). The district court found that trial counsel "reviewed all available discovery,
[and] talked to witnesses either personally or through the LDA investigator"
(R427).
Testimony from the evidentiary hearing supports the district court's findings.
Trial counsel spoke to some potential witnesses, an LDA investigator spoke to some
potential witnesses, and the police had interviewed some potential witnesses.
(Evid. Hrg. Trans, pp. 45,51,67-71,76-77,120-121). Trial counsel testified that there
were no names that Mr. Baugh had given her that she did not have information
from. Either she, or her investigator, or the police, had spoken with them (Evid.
Hrg. Trans, p. 130).
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The district court found that trial counsel"followed a reasonable and diligent
procedure in assessing the claims against petitioner, investigating available
witnesses and evidence, evaluating the likelihood of successfully urging the alibi
defense identified by petitioner, and looking at the totality of the government's case
and the strength of all evidence that could be brought forth in petitioner's defense."
(R427). "[I]n light of the relevant stages of the case, [trial counsel] made a fair and
appropriate investigation of the law and the facts which were relevant to the
plausible options." (R430).
The district court concluded that trial counsel "considered the law and the
facts available to her, proposed additional steps should petitioner wish to go to trial,
but then weighed those options against the substantial concessions offered by the
government, and advised petitioner to enter a guilty plea. He then did so." (R431).
Baugh failed to establish that his trial counsel did not make a reasonable effort
to investigate his case. See State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204, 212 (Utah App. 1991)
("Nothing in the record establishes that trial counsel failed to conduct an adequate
pre-trial investigation."). Baugh also failed to show that additional investigation by
his attorney would have yielded significant evidence in his favor. "[A] defendant
'cannot meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland test simply by identifying
unexplored avenues of investigation. Rather, he must demonstrate a reasonable
probability that further investigation would have yielded sufficient information to
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alter the outcome of his trial/" State v. Price, 909 P.2d 256, 265 (Utah App. 1995)
(quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516,523-24 (Utah 1994)). See also State v. Strain,
885 P.2d 810, 818 (Utah App. 1994) (defendant's claim of inadequate investigation
fails because defendant failed to show what evidence would have been obtained
upon further investigation).
On appeal, Baugh's arguments seem to revolve around his belief that he could
have established an alibi at trial. He argues that he could have provided witnesses
to confirm his "whereabouts for the time in question/7 (App. Brief at 4). There are
two main problems with Baugh's argument. First, he misinterprets the relevant
time frame and has not shown that the district court's factual finding is erroneous.
Second, at the evidentiary hearing in the post-conviction case, Baugh's witnesses
failed to establish a firm alibi for the time frame in which the crime could have been
committed. In addition, on cross-examination, Baugh himself could not account for
all of the time during which the crime may have occurred.
Timing of the Incident and alibi witnesses. The exact date of the crime is
unclear at best. The Amended Information charges Baugh with committing Count I
"on or about November 1, 2005 through December 31, 2005" and Count II "on or
about August 1,2005 through December 31,2005." (R199-200).
Baugh argues that the victim, NJ, said the sexual abuse occurred after Baugh
had gone to court and then dropped Cassie off at work. He then claims that Cassie's
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work records narrow the time frame of when the sexual abuse could have occurred
to three days. The State did not agree with Baugh's interpretation of NJ's statements
concerning when the crime occurred (Evid. Hrg. Trans, pp. 30-42).
At the preliminary hearing, NJ testified that she was in the car with Cassy and
Natasha when Baugh went to court (R178). NJ did not remember exactly when this
occurred, but it was before Thanksgiving (R179). In the post-conviction evidentiary
hearing, a traffic court docket was admitted which showed that Baugh was injustice
court on November 15, 2005 (Pet/s Exh. 5). Thanksgiving that year was on
November 24th (Pet/s Exh. 8). At the preliminary hearing, NJ testified that the day
Baugh went to court was not very long, not more than a week, before the sexual
abuse at the hotel (R178-179).
Trial counsel was aware of NJ's statements to police and was present when NJ
testified at the preliminary hearing (Evid. Hrg. Trans, p. 42,127). At the evidentiary
hearing in the post-conviction case, trial counsel testified that it was her
understanding that NJ said the crime occurred sometime after Baugh's court date on
November 15th and before Thanksgiving (Evid. Hrg. Trans, p. 42). She also testified
that she did not think NJ "ever said that this happened right after - immediately
after he dropped Cassie off from work/7 Id. p. 58.
In its Findings of Fact, the district court found that "[considering the
arguments of petitioner and the evidence at the hearing, and giving petitioner the
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benefit of the doubt, petitioner was seeking to establish an alibi for approximately
an eight day period, at least/' (R425). It is clear that Baugh does not agree with the
district court as to the time frame in which the crime may have occurred.8 However,
he has not established that the district court's findings were erroneous.
At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that she and Baugh had
talked about the fact that he would "have to account for every single day." (Evid.
Hrg. Trans, pp. 50-51). She also testified that Baugh "never said he could account
for every single minute." (Id. at 55). In fact, "he didn't say he could account for
even the majority of all those days. He said he could account for specific activities
on the days, but not for a continuous time frame." (Id. at 56).
The district court correctly determined that trial counsel was not ineffective.
She "made a very reasonable determination that an alibi defense seeking to account
for eight or more days would be almost impossible to establish, because there is no
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Baugh admitted time clock
records that showed Cassie's work schedule (Pet.'s Exh. 21). If the sexual abuse
occurred after Baugh dropped Cassie off at work, then it could have occurred on
November 16,18,19, or 23rd. Baugh apparently narrows this to only three days
because NJ said that the court hearing was no more than a week before the sexual
abuse (Appellant's Brief at 6). Even if Baugh's reading of the time frame were
correct, he still failed to establish a firm alibi for that three or four day period.
Baugh testified about what he did on those days, but there was still time in which
no one else verified or confirmed where he was or what he was doing (Evid. Hrg.
Trans, pp. 44,214-219). In fact, one of Baugh's witnesses testified that Baugh was at
his house watching a movie, but he stated that it was on November 5th rather than
on November 16th as Baugh claimed (Evid. Hrg. Trans, pp. 160, 215).
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suggestion that evidence exists showing that petitioner could not have been in a
position to commit the offenses against the alleged victim at some point during the
time alleged in the Information, or the shorter period that may, in fact, apply/'
(R426).
Counsel did not have a conflict of interest Baugh claims that on numerous
occasions his trial counsel told him that she was not fighting for his total innocence.
He asserts that she did not think he was guilty of rape, but she did believe that he
had sex with NJ. Baugh claims that he told his counsel he wanted to fight for his
total innocence (Appellant's Brief at 8). Baugh therefore argues that "the direction
of the defense was in conflict between Counsel and petitioner. It is the belief of the
petitioner that this conflict of interest helped in causing Counsel to be ineffective in
her handling of the petitioner's case." Id.
In order to prevail on a claim that trial counsel had a conflict of interest that
"resulted in constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant 'must
show that an actual conflict of interest existed which adversely affected his lawyer's
performance.'" State v. Newman, 928 P.2d 1040,1043 (Utah App. 1996), citing State v.
Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 73 (Utah App. 1990), denial of habeas aff'd, 853 P.2d 898 (Utah
App.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993), denial of habeas aff'd, 67 F.3d 312 (10th
Cir. 1995).
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"In order to show an actual conflict of interest existed, a defendant must point
to specific instances in the record to suggest an actual conflict or impairment of his
or her interests... 'hypothetical or speculative conflicts will not suffice to establish a
violation.'" Newman, 928 P.2d at 1044, citing State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 923
(Utah App. 1990). "Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that
counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests' and that 'an actual conflict of
interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'" Webb, 790 P.2d at 73, citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.
Baugh has not established that an actual conflict of interest existed that
adversely affected his lawyer's performance. As addressed above, the district court
found that trial counsel provided effective representation. Any disagreements that
may have arisen between Baugh and his counsel did not rise to the level of an actual
conflict of interest that violated Baugh's 6th Amendment right to the assistance of
counsel.
The district court ruled that "had petitioner insisted on his right to trial, [trial
counsel] would have defended him through trial zealously." (R426). Baugh has
failed to establish that decision was erroneous.
In the post-conviction case below, Baugh referred to counsel's preliminary
hearing argument to support his position that a conflict existed and that his counsel
believed he was guilty. In her closing argument following the preliminary hearing,
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counsel said: "Your Honor, [NJ] testified that she did this. She didn't say no. She
was never forced. She didn't ever leave. She said that in the back of her mind that
she knew that it wasn't right, the mafia story. I would say that what we have here is
consent and it would be sex with a minor." (R190).
Counsel's argument at the close of the preliminary hearing was based on the
evidence presented at the preliminary hearing. Counsel was not stating that she
believed Baugh was guilty, she was merely appropriately basing her argument as to
whether or not he should be bound over for trial on the testimony that was
presented at the preliminary hearing.
As was his right, and as is sometimes the best tactical decision, Baugh did not
testify at the preliminary hearing. Therefore, based on NJ's testimony, counsel
argued that Baugh should not be bound over on the more serious charges. She
essentially argued that based on NJ's testimony, the sexual activity was consensual.
However, NJ's testimony clearly established that she was under 18, therefore even if
consensual sex occurred, it still occurred with a minor.
Counsel's argument was appropriate following the preliminary hearing.
Counsel's argument does not establish that she believed Baugh was guilty.
Nevertheless, even if counsel had believed that Baugh was guilty, that fact alone is
not sufficient to establish that there was a conflict of interest. Counsel may still
adequately represent a client even when that client has told counsel that he is guilty.
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The issue is not whether counsel knows or believes a client is guilty, but whether an
actual conflict of interest exists.9
In the district court below Baugh did not establish that an actual conflict of
interest existed that adversely affected his lawyer's performance.

The post-

conviction court found that "[s]everal of the omissions of which petitioner
complains were only omissions because of the stage of the proceeding. For
example, had petitioner insisted on his right to trial, [trial counsel] would have
defended him through trial zealously (R426). The court also found that had the case
gone to trial, trial counsel would have undertaken additional discovery on the alibi
information (R426). "In fact, Petitioner chose to enter his plea to reduced counts a
couple of months after the preliminary hearing, and the case did not, therefore, go to
trial/' ("R426).

9

The Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
wrote that "the belief of the lawyer that the defendant in a proceeding is guilty" is
not the sort of "compelling reason" that the Code or judicial rulings have in mind as
permitting grounds for withdrawal from representation. Formal Op. 96-F-140
(1996). If all lawyers were to accept only clients they deemed innocent or worthy,
America would experience inaccessibility to representation. Michael E. Tigar,
Defending, 74 TEX. L. REV. 101, 104 (1995). As Alan Dershowitz has written,
"[njobody should become a criminal defense lawyer without being prepared to
devote the vast majority of time to representing guilty clients." "The criminal
lawyer's job, for the most part, is to represent the guilty, and- if possible - to get
them off." The Best Defense, 117-118 (1982).
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Baugh has failed to establish that the post-conviction court's findings were
erroneous. He has also failed to establish that the court's legal conclusion that trial
counsel was not ineffective was incorrect. There was a clear reasonable basis to
support the trial court's refusal to grant the petition. Therefore, Baugh is not
entitled to appellate relief.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted February J_ , 2010.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

ERIN RILEY

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT L. BAUGH, III,
Petitioner,

ORDER CONCERNING STATE'S
MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
Case No. 070917058

vs.
STATE OF UTAH,

Judge Robert K. Hilder

Respondent.
On December 4,2007, petitioner Baugh filed a state petition for post-conviction relief.
In response, the State filed a motion to dismiss. On July 29, 2008, the Court heard oral
argument on the motion to dismiss. Petitioner Baugh was present pro se. The State was
represented by assistant attorney general Erin Riley. At the conclusion of argument, the
Court entered the following order:

1.

The State's motion to dismiss is granted as to all issues except petitioner's claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel.
2.

An evidentiary hearing will be held as to petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel.
3.

In a petition for post-conviction relief, the "petitioner has the burden of p leading and

proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to
relief." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-105 (1996) (now amended to 78B-9-105).
4.

A petitioner is not entitled to relief on any ground that was raised or addressed at trial

or on appeal, or that could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(b) & (c) (now amended to 78B-9-106).
5.

However, "a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have

been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to
ineffective assistance of counsel." Utah Code Ann. § 7 8-3 5 a-106(2) (now amended to 78B9-106).
6.

Petitioner entered a guilty plea. Petitioner could have filed a motion seeking to

withdraw his guilty plea, but he did not. Therefore petitioner's direct claim related to his
guilty plea is procedurally barred. However, petitioner may choose to raise or address

-?-

portions of this claim as they specifically relate to his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
7.

Petitioner attempts to assert that he is actually innocent. However, petitioner pled

guilty and did not timely file any motion to withdraw his plea. Therefore he is not entitled
to post-conviction relief on this direct claim. However, petitioner may choose to address
certain claims he makes concerning his allegations of innocence if they specifically support
his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
8.

Petitioner alleges that he has newly discovered evidence. Petitioner is not entitled to

relief on this claim because the evidence petitioner asserts is newly discovered was already
known by his counsel, or is merely impeachment evidence. In addition, petitioner has not
established that when "viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material
evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty
of the offense or subject to the sentence received." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104 (now
amended to 78B-9-104). However, petitioner may choose to raise or address this evidence
as it specifically relates to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
9.

In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must

establish that 1) his attorney's performance was deficient, and 2) that he was prejudiced by

-3-

the deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
2064(1984).

ORDER
This Court hereby ORDERS:
1. That the State's motion to dismiss the petition for post-conviction relief is
GRANTED as to all issues EXCEPT the claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
2. An evidentiary hearing shall be held as to petitioner's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.

DATED this / ^ - day of August, 2008.
BY THE COURT:

Judge/Robert K. Hilder ^^
Third Judicial District Court Judge
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MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
Erin Riley
Assistant Attorney General
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Erin Riley
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Attorneys for Respondent

Robert L. Baugh III, #27183
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

Robert L. Baugh III
Petitioner pro se
APPROVED AS TO FORM
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P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT L. BAUGH, III,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER
DISMISSING PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

vs.
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

Case No. 070917058
Judge Robert K. Hilder

On December 4, 2007, petitioner Baugh filed a pro se petition for post-conviction
relief. In response, the State filed a motion to dismiss. Petitioner filed a response to the
State's motion to dismiss. On July 29, 2008, oral argument was held on the motion to
dismiss. Petitioner Baugh was present pro se. The State was represented by assistant
attorney general Erin Riley. Following argument, this Court granted the State's motion to

dismiss as to all issues except petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
(addendum A).
On February 20,2009, the Court heard evidence on petitioner's post-conviction relief
claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty plea in an
underlying criminal matter. Petitioner was represented by Mr. Chad Steur, and the State was
represented by Ms. Erin Riley, Assistant Attorney General. After hearing the evidence of
petitioner's trial counsel, four fact witnesses, and the petitioner, the Court then scheduled oral
argument on the State's Motion to Dismiss on March 18, 2009. Following argument, the
Court took the matter under advisement. On April 3,2009, the State provided the Court with
a copy of a recently decided United States Supreme Court case as supplemental authority.
The court has reviewed all of the evidence, the applicable law, testimony of all
witnesses, and waited a reasonable time to permit any response to the supplemental authority.
Now, having considered all of the foregoing, the Court enters the following Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
L

Petitioner was originally charged in this Court with two first degree felonies, Rape
and Forcible Sodomy. The initial criminal filing was case number 061901731.

2.

The Information in that case wras filed on March 14, 2006.
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3.

On June 30, 2006, petitioner was charged in case number 061904255 with two third
degree felonies; Issuing a Bad Check and Theft by Deception.

4.

A preliminary hearing was held in the felony sex case on October 23,2006, following
which petitioner was bound over for trial. At the conclusion of the preliminary
hearing the prosecutor moved to amend the Information to strike a specific street
address and simply allege that the incidents occurred in Salt Lake County. The Court
granted the Motion to Amend without objection from the defense.

5.

On December 8, 2006, petitioner entered a plea to two reduced charges; namely,
Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a 16 or 17 year old, a third degree felony, and Forcible
Sexual Abuse, a second degree felony.

6.

The Court notes that there was an error in the information written on the first page of
the Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel,
which assigned a second degree level to the Unlawful Sexual Conduct, and a third
degree level to the Forcible Sexual Abuse.

7.

This minor error is of no consequence, because the Court's plea record and all
subsequent proceedings clearly show that the pleas were entered at the correct levels
for each offense, and the petitioner was sentenced at the correct levels for each
offense.

8.

In addition to receiving reductions from two first degree felony charges, to a second
degree and a third degree, with substantially lower potential penalties, petitioner's
Plea Agreement also provided for the dismissal of the two third degree felonies in
case number 061904255.

9.

The pleas were taken and entered by the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, but because
Judge Hanson retired at the end of 2006, and this Court assumed his criminal
caseload, the sentence was imposed by this Court on January 26, 2007.

10.

The sentence imposed was 0 to 5 years on the third degree felony, 1 to 15 years on the
second degree felony, with the sentences to be served consecutively, and with
commitment to the state prison forthwith.

Restitution was also ordered, when

determined.
11.

Petitioner did not file any motion to withdraw his plea and did not file any direct
appeal.

12.

Within a short time after being committed to the prison, petitioner commenced filing
pro se pleadings seeking both change of counsel, and protesting his innocence. In
about mid-2007, the Court directed petitioner to proceed with a Rule 65C Motion if
he felt he had a good faith basis to do so. This action apparently resulted from that
direction.
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13.

On December 4, 2007, petitioner filed his petition for post-conviction relief.

14.

Throughout his criminal proceedings in both of the cases identified herein, petitioner
was represented by Tawni Hanseen, a felony criminal defense lawyer employed by
Salt Lake Legal Defenders. Ms. Hanseen was the first witness at the Court's
evidentiary hearing.

15.

The gravamen of petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is that he
would not have entered a guilty plea if he had been confident that his lawyer would
both investigate and assert his claimed innocence, which claim relied on an alleged
alibi defense and assertions of inconsistencies in the evidence. The alibi defense
depends on the jury accepting that petitioner did not have the opportunity to engage
in the sexual acts alleged (and which acts he specifically admitted to in his plea
colloquy) during the likely window of time during which the offenses could have been
committed in light of other evidence of the circumstances.

16.

Considering the arguments of petitioner and the evidence at the hearing, and giving
petitioner the benefit of the doubt, petitioner was seeking to establish an alibi for
approximately an eight day period, at least.

17.

In addition, petitioner alleges that his trial attorney did not adequately investigate and
interview witnesses, and did not pursue records of Comfort Inn motels in the Salt
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Lake valley that may have established that petitioner was not a registered guest at any
Comfort Inn at any relevant time. This contention is advanced to rebut any claim that
the offenses occurred at a Comfort Inn, but there is in fact no specific allegation as
to the physical location or the identity of the building or business where the offense
occurred.
Petitioner also claims that his lawyer did not adequately pursue work records at Five
Buck Pizza to establish when a potential witness, Cassie, was dropped off at work, in
light of the suggestion that the offense occurred "sometime" after Cassie was taken
to work.
Yet another claim is that trial counsel did not pursue a Motion to Suppress prior
convictions to test whether that evidence would be admitted, before concluding any
plea agreement. When boiled down to its essence, and as effectively stated by
petitioner's counsel, petitioner's claim is that although he did in fact enter his plea,
and although he admitted acts constituting the offenses to which he pleaded guilty, he
did not act knowingly because he was required to act before all the facts were known.
Stated otherwise, petitioner claims that he only pleaded guilty because he did not
believe he could win, even though he knew that he was innocent, and he seeks to
place the blame for his decision at his attorney's feet.

-6-

The Court has carefully considered the testimony of all of the witnesses, and will first
consider the evidence of petitioner's trial lawyer, Ms. Hanseen.
The Court finds that Ms. Hanseen is an experienced (about 12 years) criminal defense
lawyer who has worked for the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association for about nine
years. She maintains an average active caseload of 60 to 90 felonies.
The Court finds that Ms. Hanseen followed a reasonable and diligent procedure in
assessing the claims against petitioner, investigating available witnesses and evidence,
evaluating the likelihood of successfully urging the alibi defense identified by
petitioner, and looking at the totality of the government's case and the strength of all
evidence that could be brought forth in petitioner's defense.
More specifically, the Court finds that Ms. Hanseen reviewed all available discovery,
talked to witnesses either personally or through the LDA investigator, and made
contact with the Comfort Inn and Suites and determined that there was, in fact, no
record of petitioner as a guest at any relevant time. Ms. Hanseen also recognized,
particularly in light of evidence at the preliminary hearing, that the Comfort Inn
location was by no means the exclusive possibility for the location of the offenses,
and that even if the offenses did allegedly occur at that location, the State could argue
that petitioner registered under another name.
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The Court specifically notes that Ms. Hanseen reasonably considered her options, and
engaged in specific actions, in light of the relevant stage of the proceedings. Several
of the omissions of which petitioner complains were only omissions because of the
stage of the proceeding. For example, had petitioner insisted on his right to trial, Ms.
Hanseen would have defended him through trial zealously.
Despite the foregoing finding, the Court finds that Ms. Hanseen made a very
reasonable determination that an alibi defense seeking to account for eight or more
days would be almost impossible to establish, because there is no suggestion that
evidence exists showing that petitioner could not have been in a position to commit
the offenses against the alleged victim at some point during the time alleged in the
Information, or the shorter period that may, in fact, apply.
The Court further finds that had the matter been pursued through trial, Ms. Hanseen
likely would have pursued a Motion to Suppress the prior conviction, and she would
have undertaken additional discovery on both the location of the alleged offenses and
the alibi information. In fact, Petitioner chose to enter his plea to reduced counts a
couple of months after the preliminary hearing, and the case did not, therefore, go to
trial

-8-

27.

The Court also finds that as both Ms. Hanseen and petitioner's counsel stated, this
was a sexual assault case with no physical evidence. Therefore, credibility was
critical. Ms. Hanseen determined that if the victim was not believed by the jury,
petitioner stood a good chance of acquittal at trial. However, when Ms. Hanseen
examined the victim at the preliminary hearing she became very concerned that the
jury might perceive the victim more favorably than she had hoped. Specifically, Ms.
Hanseen found that the alleged victim was good with detail and relatively innocentappearing.

28.

As the case proceeded, Ms. Hanseen had several discussions with the petitioner
regarding the plea offer. The petitioner asked questions to which she provided
answers. Ultimately, Ms. Hanseen advised Petitioner to take the deal. Nevertheless,
she told him several times that if he wanted to go to trial, she would do all she could
for him.

29.

The petitioner testified that from his first meetings with Ms. Hanseen he told her he
was not guilty, that he intended to go to trial, and that he did not want to hear any plea
bargain talk. The Court finds that petitioner wras indeed active in seeking evidence
and identifying arguments in his support. The Court also finds, however, that
petitioner, probably understandably, focused somewhat narrowly on those items that
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he thought would help his defense; for example, the allegation at some point that the
incidents occurred at the Comfort Inn, and his belief that the time frame of the
allegation fit with certain alibi evidence.
30.

On the other hand, the Court finds that petitioner was apparently unable to accept that
there were significant alternative explanations for where the offense occurred, and
when, and that neither excluding the Comfort Inn nor establishing alibi evidence for
only relatively short time frames within a larger potential period, would still expose
him to considerable risk of conviction.

31.

The Court finds that petitioner was the person with the most direct knowledge on
virtually all of the issues that he now raises, but he nevertheless entered a knowing,
intelligent and voluntary plea, including a statement of acts that he committed to
support those pleas, and he did so for the purpose of receiving significant reductions
in charges and dismissal of two felonies.

32.

In addition, petitioner entered this plea loiowing that his trial lawyer would go to trial
if he wished, and knowing that further work, including investigation and motion
practice, could be undertaken prior to trial.

33.

The Court notes that petitioner has raised a number of other areas where witnesses
might have contradicted the evidence of the alleged \ ictim or others, but none of these
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specific instances, standing alone, would create any substantial probability of a
different outcome, even if the jury believed the evidence adduced by petitioner.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The posture of this case is that petitioner has alleged ineffective assistance of counsel
that caused him to enter a guilty plea, when he is not, in fact, guilty. The Court has
now held an evidentiary hearing, resulting in the findings set forth above.
It initially appeared that petitioner was seeking relief based on a claim that his Plea
Agreement was entered unknowingly, unintelligently, and unwillingly, but he is not
entitled tc relief on this ground, because it could have been but was not raised at trial
or on appeal Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-106(c). Because petitioner further refined his
claim to assert that the problem with his plea was caused by false or misleading
information from his counsel and/or failure in investigation and legal practice, this is
in fact a claim alleging ineffective assistance.
"The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the
evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief." Utah Code Ann. §
78B-9-105.
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4.

To meet his burden, petitioner must meet the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v.
Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

5.

The test is that (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) petitioner was
prejudiced by said deficiencies. Id. at 693. "The two-part Strickland test applies to
challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel." Hill v.
Lockhait 474 U.S. 52-58 (1985).

6.

Not only have the courts been guided by Strickland for 25 years now, the required
test, and its application in entry of plea cases, has been clearly reaffirmed in the case
provided to the Court by the State on April 3. 2009. In Knowles v. Mirzavance. 129
S.Ct. 1411, 2009 WL 746274 (U.S. March 24, 2009), a unanimous Court effectively
endorses the approach taken by Ms. Hanseen. That is, in light of the relevant stages
of the case, Ms. Hanseen made a fair and appropriate investigation of the law and the
facts which were relevant to the plausible options. In Mirzayance, the defendant was
not offered any concessions, thus greatly limiting the options about which he could
be counseled, but even in the absence of options, the Court determined that counsel
wras not required to pursue "every available nonfrivolous defense," even if there wras
nothing to lose by doing so.
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7.

In fact, in this case Ms. Hanseen considered the law and the facts available to her,
proposed additional steps should petitioner wish to go to trial, but then weighed those
options against the substantial concessions offered by the government, and advised
petitioner to enter a guilty plea. He then did so.

8.

The Court further concludes that in addition to its determination that Ms. Hanseen
performed her duties in a competent and effective manner, even if she had defended
the case according to the hypothetical model that petitioner seems to be proposing,
pursuing the "alibi" defenses, impeaching anticipated expected testimony of certain
specific events with the available witnesses, and pursuing a Motion on the prior
conviction, the Court cannot conclude that the result would be different from what
was achieved. He may, of course, have been acquitted, or he may have been
convicted of two first degree felonies, but it is not at all likely that petitioner would
have been convicted of anything less than he pleaded guilty to.

9.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the Strickland standard has
not been met. The performance of Ms. Hanseen was well within the expected
standard of performance of an experienced criminal defense lawyer, and even had she
engaged in all of the activities that petitioner now proposes, there is no reasonable
likelihood that the outcome would have been any different.
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Erin Riley, # 8375
Assistant Attorney General
Mark L. Shurtleff, #4666
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT L. BAUGH, III.,

ORDER
DISMISSING PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 070917058
STATE OF UTAH,
Judge J. Dennis Frederick
Respondent.
ORDER
Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, this Court hereby
ORDERS:
1. That the State's Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED;
2. That all of petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief are DENIED and
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
-14-

Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, u[a]ny party may appeal from the trial
court's final judgment on a petition for post-conviction relief to the appellate court having
jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-110.
A notice of appeal "shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after
the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Utah R. App. P. 4(a).

DATED this <f/~ day o ftfeC2009.
BY THE COURT:

_ ^

Judg^RtoertK.Hilder
.,o
^
Third Judicial District Court J u 3 f e f c S ^
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Mailed to Mr. Chad M. Steur on May 14, 2009
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
Erin Riley
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

Erin Riley
/
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

Mr. Chad M. Steur
Chad Steur Law, LLC
142 East 200 South, Suite 303
Sail Lake City, Utah 84111

Chad Steur
Counsel for petitioner Baugh
APPROVED AS TO FORM

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the \M

day of May, 2009,1 mailed, postage prepaid an

accurate copy of the foregoing (Proposed) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND ORDER to:
Mr. Chad M. Steur
Chad Steur Law, LLC
142 East 200 South, Suite 303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

> U^JWA-^—-

Addendum A

Erin Riley, #8375
Assistant Attorney General
Mark L. Shurtleff, #4666
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT L. BAUGH, III,
Petitioner,
vs.

ORDER CONCERNING STATE'S
MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
Case No. 070917058

STATE OF UTAH,

Judge Robert K. Holder

Respondent,
OnDecember 4; 2007, petitioner Baugh filed a state petition for past-conviction relief
In response, the State Sled a motion to dismiss. On July 29, 2008, the Court heard oral
argument on the motion to dismiss. Petitioner Baugh was present pro se. The State was
represented by assistant attorney general Erin Riley. At the conclusion of argument, the
Court entered the following order:

1,

The State's motion to dismiss is granted as to all issues except petitioner's claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel,
2.

An evidentiary hearing will be held as to petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel,
3,

In a petition for post-conviction relief, the "petitioner has the burden of pleading and

proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to
relief Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-105 (1996) (now amended to 783-9-105).
4,

A petitioner is not entitled to relief on any ground that was raised or addressed at trial

or on appeal, or that could bave been but was not raised at trial or on appeal. Utah Code
Ann, § 78-35a-lQ6(l)(b) & (c) (now amended to 78B-9-106).
5.

However, "a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have

been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to
ineffective assistance of counsel" Utah Code Ann, § 7S-35a-106(2) (now amended to 7S39-106).
6.

Petitioner entered a guilty plea. Petitioner could have filed a morion seeking to

withdraw his guilty plea, but he did not. Therefore petitioner's direct claim related to his
guilty plea is procedurally barred. However, petitioner may choose to raise or address

-?.

portions of this claim as they specifically relate to his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
7,

Petitioner attempts to assert that he is actually innocent However, petitioner pled

guilty and did not timely file any motion to withdraw his plea. Therefore he is not entitled
to post-conviction relief on this direct claim. However, petitioner may choose to address
certain claims he makes concerning his allegations of innocence if they specifically support
his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
8,

Petitioner alleges that he has newly discovered evidence. Petitioner is not entitled to

relief on this claim because the evidence petitioner asserts is newly discovered was already
known by his counsel, or is merely impeachment evidence. In addition, petitioner has not
established that when "viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material
evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty
of the offense or subject to the sentence received." Utah Code Ann, § 78-35a-104 (now
amended to 78B-9-104). However5 petitioner may choose to raise or address this evidence
as it specifically relates to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
9,

In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must

establish that 1) his attorney's performance wras deficient, and 2) that he was prejudiced by

1h$ deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668s 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
2064 (1984).

ORDER
This Court hereby ORDERS:
1. That the State's motion to dismiss the petition for post-conviction relief is
GRANTED as to all issues EXCEPT the claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
2. An evidentiary hearing shall be held as to petitioner's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.

7*

DATED this &~

day of August, 2008.
BY THE COURT:

J^geAokert K. Wilder.
Third Judicial District Court Judge
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Mailed to Robert Baugh on August 4S 2008 by
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
Erin Riley
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lalce City, Utah 84114-0854

Erin Riley
Assistant Attorney Gener
Attorneys for Respondent

Robert L. Baugh III, #27183
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

Robert L. Baugh III
Petitioner pro se
APPROVED AS TO FORM

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

L

\

day of August, 2008,1 mailed, postage prepaid an

accurate copy of the foregoing (Proposed) ORDER CONCERNING STATE'S MOTTONTO
DISMISS PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF to:
Robert LBaugh HI, #27183
Utah State Prison
P.O.Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

